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Chapter 32 Place-in-Process in Colm Toíbín’s The Blackwater Lightship: Emotion, SelfIdentity, and the Environment
Nancy Easterlin, University of New Orleans

The increasingly practical orientation of universities today creates, understandably,
considerable anxiety among humanists, whose several disciplines are no longer seen by many as
central to the mission of higher education. That mission has gradually shifted towards equipping
students for jobs rather than teaching them to think. Realistically, both of these are viable
objectives, and each is better served if viewed in symbiotic relation to the other. In this light,
honest soul-searching on the part of humanists about the relevance of our fields to contemporary
life is likely to result in both articulate defense of traditional programs as well as innovative
interdisciplinary courses of study. Indeed, this challenge urgently suggests that humanists once
and for all seek out valid consideration of the sciences in the service of intellectually and
ethically committed programs. Cognitive approaches to literature, which have grown in variety,
depth, and extent for the last quarter century, serve a central role in the renewal of literary
studies, since they depart from the perceived isolationism of liberal humanism on the one hand
and the irrationalism of poststructuralism on the other.
The focus of the present anthology is texts and affects, a topic of central relevance to
psychological approaches to literature taking an embodiment perspective. My goal here is to
further augment the already notable diversity of cognitive literary studies by demonstrating the
inextricability of thought and feeling in the relation of people to the environment through the
little-explored area of place studies. “Place,” understood as an ongoing process, has an array of
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components, including emotion, intellection, memory, self-definition, sociality, culture, and
physical location. Like other aspects of cognition and emotion, the dynamic construction of place
is largely unconscious. One of the ethical functions of all cognitive literary studies is to bring
subconscious processes to awareness, and because the affective-conceptual construction of place
(more accurately, place-in-process) is a quite complex phenomenon, applying place studies to
literary interpretation promises to extend the range of cognitive approaches to literature, which
have not sufficiently attended to the importance of the physical world in cognitive-affective
processes. Moreover, one great benefit of much narrative literature is that place-in-process is
often vividly dramatized through the actions and perspectives of represented persons--narrators
and/or characters--in concrete situations unfolding in time. Textual representations that highlight
the person-to-place dynamic therefore render an unconscious phenomenon available for analysis.
Focusing on Colm Tóibín’s 1999 The Blackwater Lightship,1 a novel which foregrounds the
relationship of humans to the physical environment, I adopt the perspective of place studies to
interpret changing feelings for material spaces as an integral component of evolving self-identity
and human relationships.

Affective Theory, Affective Neuroscience, and Place Studies
Attending to the complex of factors that both inform human feelings about the
environment and result in dynamic processes of affective-conceptual redefinition of self and
physical locale, place studies is central to cognitive ecocriticism, which holds that humans, like
other animals, have a species-typical, self-interested orientation toward the environment.2
Furthermore, place studies are convergent with affective neuroscience, embodiment psychology,
evolutionary theory, and a host of other fields across the social and natural sciences. They align
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with “affective science” rather than “affect theory” (or “affective poststructuralism”), to
draw on Patrick Colm Hogan’s useful distinctions.3 The two areas of study differentiated by
Hogan are not, to my mind, generally intellectually compatible directions in humanistic
interdisciplinary investigations, for reasons that I explain briefly here.
In contrast to affective neuroscience, affect theory (affective poststructuralism), arose
about twenty years ago as a reorientation of cultural studies, ostensibly through an embrace of
science. However, the primary influences on affect theory are philosophers, not scientists,
including Baruch Spinoza, Henri Bergson, Gilles Deleuze, and Gilbert Simondon. As a result of
this orientation toward modern and postmodern philosophy, many theoretical assumptions of
affect theory conflict not only with the science on which it draws but with the use of scientific
research programs in cognitive literary and cultural studies, including those devoted to emotion
and feeling.
Constantina Papoulias and Felicity Callard identify the emergence of affect theory in the
mid-1990s with Eve Sedgwick and Adam Frank’s introduction to the writings of the
psychologist Silvan Tomkins. According to Papoulias and Callard, this turn in cultural studies
“[remaps] the conceptual terrain of theory . . . [via] the turn to affect and to an embracing of a
particular kind of biology.”4 In this revision, biology becomes “a fluid and dynamic spatiality”
and “essentially . . . a creative space, a field of potentiality that crucially, precedes the
overwriting of the body through subjectivity and personal history.”5 This conceptualization of
biology as “a fluid and dynamic spatiality” diverges from theory and practice in the sciences.
Indeed, biology has been long governed by the theory of evolution by natural selection, because
it yields results and has not been disproven, and in consequence is concerned with very specific,
though diverse and variable, interactions. Evolution by natural selection posits that chance
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mutations contribute to individual fitness and species survival under certain environmental
conditions, since genetic traits can only be advantageous or deleterious under particular
conditions. In contrast, the redefinition of “biology” in affect studies is strangely abstract.
The definition of “affect” in affect studies is likewise abstract. In his seminal 1995 article
“The Autonomy of Affect,” the prominent theorist Brian Massumi insists that “an asignifying
philosophy of affect” critically forestalls engagement with “received psychological categories,”
which have been, in his view, successfully destabilized by poststructuralism. In keeping with the
purpose of resisting social interpellation via conventional psychological categories, Massumi
claims that “[a]ffect is most often loosely used as a synonym for emotion. But one of the clearest
lessons of this first story is that emotion and affect—if affect is intensity—follow different logics
and different orders.”6 Along the same lines, Massumi asserts, “Affect is autonomous to the
degree to which it escapes confinement in the particular body whose vitality, or potential for
interaction, it is. Formed, qualified, situated perceptions and cognitions fulfilling functions of
actual connection or blockage are the capture and closure of affect . . . . If there were no escape,
no excess or remainder, no fade-out to infinity, the universe would be without potential, pure
entropy, death. Actually existing, structured things live in and through that which escapes them.
Their autonomy is the autonomy of affect.”7
On at least three separate points, Massumi’s notion of affect diverges from an
evolutionary-cognitive perspective. First, the basic definition does not correspond to that of
affective science. For scientists, the term is, as Massumi notes, “loosely used as a synonym for
emotions,”8 and, indeed, scientists routinely refer to feelings and emotions as “affects.” This is
not merely a semantic matter, but one with profound philosophical and practical consequences,
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since all perspectives consilient with evolutionary theory agree that emotions (affects) are
specifically functional, not vehicles for liberation from actuality.
Second, therefore, in claiming that “structured things live in and through that which
escapes them,” Massumi contradicts any and every possible account of organism-environment
interaction, for no organism simply energized by an ambient and overflowing intensity can
survive to procreate. Simply put, organisms and environments are mutually dependent entities,
and affects serve ongoing evaluation of the environment, as organisms confront predators and
responded to other uncertainties, such as changes in weather. This is why the “situated
perceptions and cognitions” that Massumi eschews are such a current topic in the study of
embodied mind. For higher organisms like human beings, in fact, environmental attunement
depends not only on embodied sensation and emotion but perception, intellection, and
awareness.
Third, then, and logically related to the second point, when Massumi claims that “[w]ill
and consciousness are subtractive . . . limitative derived functions which reduce complexity too
rich to be functionally expressed,”9 he is once more out of step with contemporary science. In
fact, the attention necessary for immersion in intensity has been facilitated by the evolution of
the human brain for executive function—high levels of awareness (consciousness) are served by
symbolic skill, which enables mediation between existing thoughts and new thoughts.10 If
awareness (consciousness) is the organism’s long-term governor and guidance system,
automaticity (habituation) is the result of hierarchization.11 Ironically, one of the benefits of such
complex cognitive organization is that humans can consciously reflect on behavior that has
become automatized—that is, pushed below the level of consciousness.
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In sum, from an evolutionary standpoint, signification, meaning, and consciousness
are not reductive and limiting functions, although they certainly serve these purposes just as well
as expansive ones stimulating original thought and action. But even if the theoretical ground of
affect theory is not consistent with evolutionary and affective science, we should nevertheless
acknowledge that this turn in cultural studies echoes some of the epistemic and ethical priorities
of cognitive literary criticism. The implication that humans are largely unaware of the
complexity of their everyday experience basically accords with the evolutionary social sciences
and related fields, such as embodiment psychology and philosophy, as well as the environmental
humanities, the emergent interdisciplinary field that has evolved out of ecocriticism and the
environmental sciences and is currently enjoying remarkable growth within the academy. In
addition, scientists themselves remark on the over-simplifications and biases within science. As
Andrew Packard and Jonathan Delafield-Butt note, for example, Darwinian complexity
sometimes vanishes from neo-Darwinian gene-centered selection theory as well as “social and
cognitive interpretations of emergent evolution.”12 The atavistic return to dualistic thinking that
Packard and Delafield-Butt pinpoint here is remedied by affective neuroscience, which
recognizes not only the homology between all mammalian emotion systems but the
inextricability of such systems from cognitive processes.
Today, literary studies will be best served by informed engagement with a wide variety of
fields devoted to human cognition, emotion, and interaction. Cognitive literary studies illustrate
the usefulness of many research programs in assisting conscious knowledge of reader
psychology, textual structures, metaphor, character interaction, and other relevant areas of
analysis. Although ecocriticism has paid some attention to place, its affective-conceptual
importance in human life has not been thoroughly explored. One of the ethical functions of
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cognitive literary studies as a component of the environmental humanities is to enhance
conscious understanding of place-in-process, the affective-conceptual construction of physical
locations that changes in light of events, experiences, and relationships. Because realistic
narrative literature frequently depicts the actions and perspectives of represented persons in
concrete situations, it often shows how feelings toward material spaces evolve dynamically along
with human relationships. Everyday life is full of “surging affects,” as the cultural anthropologist
Kathleen Stewart insists.13 However, far from being “subtractive,” as Massumi asserts,
psychosocial analysis of these intensities serves human ethics and freedom by submitting largely
unconscious processes to higher awareness. Because place studies are highly diverse and
extremely cautious in their reductions, they can illuminate, without “subtractive” incisions, the
intensities and dynamic shifts of place-in-process in literary representations.

What Is Place Studies?
Place studies emerged out of human geography in the 1970s, and although geography on
the whole has been reconfigured into other ascendant disciplines, such as environmental ecology
and environmental psychology, in the past decade place studies have continued to grow and
diversify.14 As Maria Lewicka reports in her 2011 overview, the field attests to 400 articles
published in 120 journals in 40 years, 60% of that total in the ten-year period between 2001 and
2011.15 The study of place is an excellent example of how an intellectually and methodologically
diverse interdisciplinary area avoids the comprehensive ideological bias and harmful reductions
that affect theorists and evolutionary biologists alike justifiably warn against. Scholarship in
place dynamics is both qualitative and quantitative and “[represents] all branches of social
sciences, including environmental psychology, sociology, community psychology, human
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geography, cultural anthropology, gerontology, demography, urban studies, leisure science
and tourism, ecology, forestry, architecture and planning, and economics.”16
The definition of “place” offered by Irwin Altman and Setha Low in their influential
1992 collection enjoys broad acceptance: “Place, in our general lexicon, refers to space that has
been given meaning through personal, group, or cultural processes. . . . . [P]laces may vary in
several ways—scale or size and scope, tangible versus symbolic, known and experience versus
not known or not experienced.”17 According to this definition, place is 1) a cognitive
construction entailing the human imposition of meaning on a specific physical area (or space); 2)
a process based on human processes (e.g., development, aging, life events, and ongoing social
interactions); and 3) a major feature of speculative-imaginative thought as well as lived
experience. Place is, in sum, an integrated concept that includes both subjective and objective
components, such as affective, cognitive, and practical attachments; varied actors and a range of
social relationships (individuals, groups, and cultures); and linear as well as cyclical temporal
dimensions.18 As Altman and Low explain, although the early decades of place studies focused
on individual cognitive functioning, by the 1990s phenomenological approaches had gained
increasing importance, and the area has retained this commitment to phenomenology even as it
has diversified in methods and disciplinary connections over the past quarter century.19
Place is not one dimensional in its meanings and affective tone, and although
modernization and mobility alter its scale, often expanding place to the region and the nation
versus the local community, its importance does not dissipate.20 Indeed, Lewicka’s survey of
research in place studies indicates that the desire for “the particularity of place—for what is truly
‘local’ or ‘regional,’” longing for “identity, character, and nuance,” is increased rather than
deadened by banal modern planning, disaster, dislocation, and fragmentation.21
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Why, in the face of increasing mobility, does place retain such persistent emotional
force? First of all, a physical and emotional base provides the stabilizing ground for secure
human attachments and their relation to identity, independence, adventure, and sympathy. Home
is “a major fixed reference point for the structuring of reality.”22 Home is our essential place, a
central site in our dialectical need for drudgery and escape.23 And as many place theorists point
out, home is not simply confined to a physical locale and the feelings for it, but feeds
dynamically back into individual and social dimensions. As Antonio Cristoforetti et al put it,
home, recognized as the quintessential place, “includes and completes a person’s self-image and
sense of identity.”24 Associated with identity, order, rootedness, attachment, privacy, and
security, home provides not only an anchor but also an evolving site in the process of selfdefinition.
This view accords with neuroscience, developmental psychology, and evolutionary
studies.25 From the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio, who identifies the self as a fundamental
point of reference, to attachment theorists and human geographers, who insist on the
developmental continuity between infant-caregiver attachment and feeling for the total
environment (i.e., including other persons and the nonhuman natural world), contemporary
science and social science overwhelmingly recognize that identity and functional efficacy are
physically and spatially grounded. Conceptions of self, home, and place are developmentally and
dynamically interrelated, transforming with experience.26 The first place of the infant is, then, in
positive development, usually the site of initial attachments, and that core place attachment also
typically operates in adult life, irrespective of the frequency of the individual’s travel. Moreover,
affective neuroscientists such as Jaak Panksepp and Keith Oatley posit that mechanisms of place
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attachment reside in evolutionarily ancient parts of the brain and provided the ontogenetic
basis for emergent social attachment.27
Cultural analyses attentive to the shift in human lifeways resulting from the
Enlightenment and industrialization support the ongoing significance of place and home in
human experience and are congruent with a cognitive-evolutionary perspective. Over fifty years
ago, Alan McKillop traced the term “Heimweh,” denoting homesickness-in-exile, to 1596.
Significantly, while Enlightenment rationalism disparaged the local attachment to which
homesickness attested, castigating the love of native place as folk ignorance, the longer classical
tradition connects love of native place with cosmopolitanism. Along the same lines, the love of
home place should not be conflated with nostalgia, the idealized love of a place that no longer
exists or never existed.28 Instead, the conceptual and linguistic emergence of homesickness
attests to feelings of actual disruption in the face of increased mobility, prompted by urbanization
and warfare. Adding this to the perspective of evolutionary social science, a bio-cultural
explanation for the enduring primacy of home emerges. As environmental psychologists,
biologists, and others point out, humans are strongly predisposed to orient from “a major fixed
reference point for the structuring of reality” that “includes and completes a person’s self-image
and sense of identity,” because they evolved as a far-ranging, home-based species. Thus, the still
widely held misconception that love of one’s local environment militates against broader
sympathy and experience couldn’t be more wrong: such place connection provides the
foundation for geographic exploration and cross-cultural connection.
Place attachment is one in a series of concepts characterizing feelings for distinct
environments; it includes a feeling of belonging, or of what Edward Relph calls insideness. In
recent decades, human geographers have transformed Relph’s useful but rudimentary
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dichotomy--insideness and outsideness—into nuanced typologies of place perception—
positive, ambivalent, and negative. Lewicka’s recent modification of the accepted typology
retains but refines core concepts.29 Among these, traditional attachment refers to an everyday
feeling of belonging and insideness that usually emerges from long-term association with the
physical location and community. Active attachment defines a committed, conscious effort to
engage with a place, as opposed to the long-term or lifetime association implied by traditional
attachment. Such active attachment often has an ideological, social, or political component (as is
the case of attachment among many recent residents of New Orleans, who relocated to help
rebuild the city post-Katrina).
In contrast to both traditional and active attachment, place alienation signifies an attitude
of actual dislike, which is distinguished from place relativity or ambivalence as well as
placelessness or indifference. All of these modes include, to one degree or another, a feeling of
outsideness, a lack of or uncertain affective connection to the local environment, although place
relativity suggests conflicted feelings and thus perhaps contradictory components of insidenesss
and outsideness. As my analysis of place-in-process in The Blackwater Lightship will elaborate,
positive and negative perceptions of place change via feedback between social relationships,
physical locations, self-identity, and other factors, so that categories within this typology often
reflect a phase in a shifting affective-cognitive apprehension rather than a fixed attitude.
Most commonly, the processes typically leading to place attachment, to a strong positive
feeling for the nonhuman natural and the social environment, emerge early in human
development as the infant progressively expands its sense of home. In this process, the young
child extends attention from the secure base of the body of its primary caregiver (usually the
mother) to the adjacent persons and physical environment. Recent research in environmental
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psychology concurs with long-held views of the logic of attachment throughout the life
span, identifying a secure base and high environmental quality as key features.30 For the human
infant, being held close, fed frequently, kept clean and comfortable, protected from noise and
other stimuli signifying potential threats, and loved—an affect strengthened through eye contact,
caressing, and rhythmic, repetitive, mutual vocalizations (motherese)—constitute a viable, safe
environment, and enduring, warm feelings typically extend, over the child’s early years, from the
interior spaces of the house to the garden and local community. But not everyone has a positive
developmental experience, and many people move far away from their birthplaces, taking up
residence in towns and cities and natural environments that differ substantially from what they
were accustomed to as children. Thus, the usual attachment emerging in childhood is neither
universal nor permanent, and it is likewise subject to many variations as a result of individual
experience.31
In spite of the growing awareness that conceptualization of and feeling for place is much
modified by contemporary patterns of mobility, the importance of a prototypical place, “a major
fixed reference point for the structuring of reality” that provides identity, order, rootedness,
attachment, privacy, and security, is not disputed in the field. Similarly, the usual cause of strong
place attachment remains consistent over time. Researchers over the past several decades
conclude that the quality of a person’s social connections within the specified area is the central
factor in attachment. As David Hummon reported in 1992, “local social involvements—
particularly those with friends, but also those involving kin, organizational memberships, and
local shopping—prove to be the most consistent and significant source of sentimental ties to
local places.”32 This correlation between social bonds and place attachment chimes with
evolutionary explanations. In the several million years during which humans species transitioned
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from forests to the more exposed environment of the African savanna, simultaneously
evolving large brains and bipedal locomotion, the social group became the most critical feature
of survival.33
The personal processes affecting place perception, in turn, feed back into identity and
self-worth, wherein factors such as local landscape, community, and neighborhood
simultaneously serve to define the self and to stand as symbolic extensions of it. Whereas strong
place attachment and a correspondingly secure sense of home, “a major fixed reference point for
the structuring of reality,” correlate psychologically with secure identity—the feeling of
insideness (or rootedness) corresponding to self-perception as, for instance, cosmopolitan citydweller or a small town inhabitant—the lack or loss of such a fixed reference point often goes
hand-in-hand with problems of identity and self-worth. Thus, in the field’s scholarly literature,
placelessness or place alienation, correlated with a feeling of outsideness or uprootedness,
sometimes corresponds to a troubled primary place attachment or home.34
Because spaces and persons engage in a definitional-conceptual dynamic of place and
identity, then, positive place-in-process contributes to individual agency. At the same time,
however, the productive affective attachment to physical locales and their sociocultural
dimensions is constrained by the specifics of the environment. In other words, the material
surround, human others, and sociocultural codes act as external regulators of individuals even as
they enable autonomous action. Developmentalist Paul Morgan posits this function for growing
children, a perspective that echoes ecological psychologist Roger Barker’s work in the sixties.35
Indeed, Barker concludes, based on his field studies of children in Midwest, Kansas, that the
environment is often a better predictor of behavior than the tendencies of individual youngsters.
Thus, while on the one hand attachment to persons and locations encourages the positive self-
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image and feeling of security that enable extended interpersonal and spatial relationships, on
the other what Barker refers to as the “behavioral setting” (physical environment combined with
social codes and expectations) can exert very different degrees and kinds of influence on both
identity and behavior.36

Place Studies in Cognitive-Evolutionary Perspective
The key findings of place studies overlap with the broader picture provided by
evolutionary social science, which, since the latter half of the twentieth century, has extended
and refined Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection through research in an array of
subfields, including evolutionary, cognitive, developmental, and environmental psychology.
Place studies lend further support to the ontogenetic functionality of human bonding, which has
been recognized as a crucial aspect of species viability for over half a century. In the earliest
phase of human life, nascent emotions compel the neonate to solicit proximity and attention from
the caregiver, who is motivated to respond by complementary affective and hormonal
mechanisms. Beginning with John Bowlby’s seminal research in the 1960s, attachment theory
has provided a widely accepted explanation for the evolved purpose of the emotional bond
between baby and caregiver: it protects the infant from predators and other threats.37
However, given the likelihood that humans— medium size, not particularly swift
organisms—evolved under conditions of increasing exposure to predators and competing groups
as they gradually took up a savanna lifestyle, a bond between parent and baby would hardly be
enough to ensure species survival.38 Thus, attachments to family, extending to kinship groups of
about fifty to a hundred persons, supplied the necessary adhesive for safety in numbers. To
operate as a cohesive social unit, individuals had to desire proximity to other group members.
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Ironically, then, emotional attachment systems, which have quickly become idealized over
the brief course of cultural evolution (approximately 10,000 years), have been a crucial element
in the material survival of the human species.
Furthermore, the efficacy of attachment in promoting group cohesion has broader
implications, serving as a principle element in a ubiquitous sociality. Human ancestors living
between 4.5 and 1.8 million years ago, the Australopithecenes, show signs of bipedalism,
increased brain size, and sexual dimorphism. Although researchers debate whether
Australopithecenes had home bases, which serve as a locus for childcare and food-sharing,
evidence suggests that these pre-hominids were adapted to living in relatively open landscapes
by two million years ago and therefore were characterized by the emotional range and larger
brain size that accompanies survival in open landscapes and increased social group size.
Humans are, in fact, the most pervasively social of mammalian species. Whereas
evolutionists debate the central causes and order of emergence for specific adaptations such as
bipedalism, large brains, and language, their functional efficacy in promoting and extending
sociality is today increasingly recognized.39 For instance, biopedalism may have evolved
primarily to improve mobility, reduce heat stress, or free the hands, but in any case it facilitates
face-to-face interaction and thus enhances social relations. Likewise, increased brain size is a
requirement of bipedalism, which necessitates the coordination of many muscle groups, but it is
also imperative for resource extraction in shifting habitats and for the maintenance of social
relationships in large groups.
Increasingly, evolutionary social science recognizes the interdependence of high
intelligence, sociality, cognitive flexibility, and habitat variability in the unique character of
human evolution.40 Whereas most species occupy a distinct ecological niche, selecting habitats
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whose specific features match their survival needs, humans evolved as a home-based,
wayfinding, knowledge-seeking species who use intelligence instrumentally. Emphasizing the
inextricability of affective motivations and intellectual function, the environmental psychologist
Stephen Kaplan surmises that early hominids “[carried out] information-based processes [such
as] recognition, prediction, evaluation, and action.”41 Guided by feelings of apprehension and
excitement in new environments, these ancestors cognitively assessed factors including
unfamiliar animals, plants, cloud patterns, terrain, and competing conspecifics to determine the
viability of novel environments. For humans, this active engagement in niche construction
ultimately led to adaptation to every known natural habitat, but it also depended upon the
evolution of conscious awareness (i.e., Donald’s executive function) and increased social
interaction. Evolutionary philosopher Kim Sterelny “[argues] that humans extract resources from
their environment in a unique way: via collaborative application of expertise. Foraging is both
cooperative and dependent on expertise and technology.”42 Sterelny notes that cooperative
foraging in seasonal habitats prompts a new form of ecological interaction, one that requires
adult technological skill and learning. Learning itself is inherently social, reliant on shared
attention and intention for the successful use of information that cannot be hard-wired.
Research findings in place studies highlight the perpetuity of the core dynamics of human
life that evolved over approximately five million years. Today, home bases serve as “a major
fixed reference point for the structuring of reality” and the self because they emerged
phylogenetically as sites of nurture, mutual support, and sustenance. Varying categories of
emotional connection to physical locations, such as place attachment, relativity, and alienation,
are largely reflective of affective and social factors. This accords with the centrality of the social
group in evolutionary logic. As a wayfinding, knowledge-seeking species, hominids gathered
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information from diverse environments, in the process learning how to extract resources and
manipulate shifting habitats. As a knowledge-gathering, meaning-making species, therefore,
humans relied on cognitive flexibility rather than hard-wired response. Modern culture today
depends on collaboration and cooperation, which themselves involve shared intention and
attention. Thus, whereas Massumi asserts that “situated perceptions and cognitions” signal the
closure of affect, evolutionary social science and place studies tell us otherwise: identifiable
emotional bonds with specific persons and locales establish a reference point (affective,
cognitive, and material) for the securely based self, thus enabling intensities and affectivephysical extension of that self into disparate physical and social environments.

Affect, Environment, Identity: The Blackwater Lightship
Scholars of contemporary Irish fiction have repeatedly noted the integral relationship of
place and character psychology in Colm Toíbín’s fiction. In the words of José Carregal Romero,
“As no individual is disconnected from the physical and imaginary space she or he inhabits,
Toíbín’s central characters often become entangled in complex attachments to place, past and
community. Thus, Toíbín’s protagonists cannot escape their personal histories and their Irish
cultural inheritance.”43 Going one step beyond Carregal Romero, Liam Harte points to Toíbín’s
“subtle geographic imagination in which space, place, and landscape are active determinants of
identity and experience rather than passive, static entities.”44 In much of Toíbín’s fiction, the
dynamics of place-in-process are particularly shaped by Irish socio-religious history in both a
top-down and bottom-up manner. Because moral policing of both women’s sexuality and
homosexuality has been a traditional aspect of Irish culture and, moreover, a feature of women’s
responsibility in that culture as the representatives of the Church in the home, domestic spaces in
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Toíbín’s fiction often serve a somewhat repressive role as behavioral settings that regulate
emotion and the self.45 In The Blackwater Lightship, Toíbín shows how characters’
conceptualization of domestic space and surrounding environment as place operate as a
constraint on emotion, self, social community, and environmental exploration, simultaneously
lending disproportionate control to the cultural-ideological aspects of behavioral setting. The
intervention of a new social group, a novel family unit of gay men, provides the necessary break
with convention required to transform the behavioral setting and, with it, perception of self,
place, and nuclear family. This analysis will address the dynamic of affective modes, memory,
and social relationships in the construction of domestic spaces as places, focusing primarily on
Helen, the novel’s main character.
At the heart of Toíbín’s novel is a young man, Declan, who is dying of AIDS. However,
the story is focalized through Declan’s sister Helen, the main character, and its drama centers on
the nearly two decades of repressed anger between Helen and their mother, Lily. As the narrative
unfolds, Toíbín gradually reveals the sources of the bitterness between the two women. When the
children were young (Helen eleven and Declan eight), their father was diagnosed with cancer
and died soon after. While he was in the hospital, Lily stayed with him in Dublin, and the
children lived with their grandparents in the guest house by the sea at Cush. Feeling abandoned
by their mother at that time, Helen has never forgiven her. She is additionally aggrieved that,
first, while in college, she was required by her grandmother and mother to work at the Cush
guest house when she had planned to go with friends to America for two summers. Second, at
the time of graduating from college, the two older women had arranged a teaching job for her in
Enniscorthy, although she had already found a job in Dublin and preferred to stay there. Having
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walked out the back door of the Shelbourne Hotel where the three of them were taking tea
and discussing her future, Helen has not communicated with them in the eight years since,
excluding them from her wedding and the life of her young family. Declan’s illness not only
forces these family members together again but, of great importance in the process of
transformation, introduces them to his community of gay friends.
Although domestic space is the prototypical arena of strong family feeling and core
identity, Helen, like her mother Lily, exhibits place relativity in connection to home.46 In fact,
she consciously avoids an environment that evokes traditional or active attachment, that is, the
sense of deep insideness or belonging resulting from long-term association with a physical
location and its community; instead, she fashions a somewhat sterile home environment cut off
from the personal and cultural past so that the place—the material space and the meanings
associated with it--functions to repress and control feeling. This “capture or closure of affect” or
intensity is not, however, contra Massumi, the product of situatedness; perception, cognition, and
experience are situated in any case. Rather, Helen gravitates toward a home situation that limits
and controls her emotional engagements, identity, and larger reality.
Toíbín signals Helen’s aversion to traditional attachment and her concomitantly
precarious emotional attachments at the outset of the novel. In the initial description of the house
and the reasons for choosing it, Helen’s husband Hugh serves as a foil to his wife:
They were the first to live in this house, and the first in their estate to build an
extension—a large, square, bright room which served as kitchen and dining-room and
playroom. Hugh had wanted the house for the beech tree which, through some miracle,
had been left in their back garden, and the park behind the house. She had liked only the
newness, the idea that no one had ever lived here before. (6)
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Unlike Helen, Hugh is attracted to the natural spaces and objects outside the house; thus, his
“fixed reference point for the structuring of reality” includes adjacent nonhuman nature as part of
domestic sphere. Hugh’s conception of home place, then, reaffirms and extends his expansive,
secure self-identity. By contrast, Helen’s attraction to “the idea that no one had ever lived [in the
house] before” reflects her desire to suppress memory and encourages her inclination to a
potentially destructive self-containment. Wondering “why [Hugh] needed someone who had
none of his virtues,” she recognizes her impulse to keep him at a distance, stemming from “the
raw areas in her which were unsettled and untrusting” (25). Helen’s emotional ambivalence is of
a piece with her place relativity, for if the house addition, the great room, is a joint endeavor that
embodies for husband and wife their mutual commitment and extension of selfhood outward,
Helen’s attraction to a locale divorced from the past signifies a countermovement. In Helen’s
case, a home cut off from the past assists repression and distrust, reaffirming the low self-esteem
revealed in her amazement that Hugh loves her.
Just as Helen values her home for what it is not, defining herself in relation to her
immediate family and professional life and eliminating extended family and childhood memory
from her orbit, her place relativity feeds a more generalized social ambivalence. In the novel’s
opening chapter, Hugh and Helen host a party to celebrate the first year of the new Irish school
where Hugh teaches. All the guests, with the exception of Helen and a few neighbors, speak Irish
fluently, and they also participate in traditional singing later in the evening. Anders Olsson notes
that, in Toíbín’s fiction, those who have mastered the Irish language sufficiently are insiders, and
the same might be said of singing in this author’s works.47 That Helen, a highly accomplished
school principal, does not speak Irish fluently confirms her place relativity, her ambivalent
relationship to her home and with her family, since Hugh teaches at the new Irish school and
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speaks only Irish to their young sons as well as his colleagues. Helen effectively self-selects
as a partial outsider within her own home, tentatively participating in the bonding effects of
shared language and song. This home-based identity defines both her most intimate relationships
and her community social engagements, as the party scene demonstrates. The cognitive
archaeologist Steven Mithen suggests that pre-linguistic rhythmic utterances— proto-music-preceded language in early exchange and ritual, and that music, often called the language of the
emotions, is even today most typically a shared activity whose affiliative rewards are caused by a
release of oxytocin.48 Recent studies in the affective neuroscience of music also point to its
universality, developmental efficacy, social salience, and emotionally evocative force. Likewise,
while language (an extremely recent evolutionary phenomenon) undoubtedly improves
communication and recursive thought, it may have evolved primarily as a social bonding
mechanism instead of an informational tool, and its origins may be inextricable from those of
music.49
Helen has fashioned a highly functional identity in part through control of her home
environment, a space defined by the absence of memory, extended family connections, and the
part of the self constituted by the past. However, although using new spaces to sever connections
to the past may be, in the short term, productive for Helen, in the long term such repression
damages personal and interpersonal development. Therapists have long recognized that selfperception and place attachment are intimately linked, and Helen’s uneasy relationships to these
home places continues to affirm her negative self-image, reflected in her assessment that her
husband Hugh is superior to her and in her guilt about the parts of herself she hides from him.
Re-envisioning a past place of value helps establish self-coherence, suggests the therapist
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Michael A. Godkin, who has emphasized the importance of place memories in overcoming
negative self-perception and feelings of rootlessness.50
Moreover, the vast majority of human lives are characterized by places-in-process,
because they typically entail an array of physical locations, human communities, and
relationships, not a single, discrete space. As she travels south to inform her grandmother and
mother of Declan’s illness, Helen must of necessity confront the places associated with repressed
memories. If Helen’s own house embodies and reasserts her place relativity—her simultaneous
desire for and reluctance to embrace rootedness, insideness, and belonging based in shared
feelings and locations—her initial reaction on her return to her grandmother’s house shades over
into place alienation, closer to a feeling of actual dislike than ambivalence. Helen notices the torn
linoleum, peeling wallpaper, and flaking paint, and the old mattress and inexpensive, worn sheets
are uncomfortable to the touch. Because Helen and Declan were cared for by their grandparents
during their father’s illness, this deeply known but long unacknowledged place embodies and
revives Helen’s childhood fear of abandonment and death and the attendant anger that she
recognizes as the source of her emotional ambivalence.
Although Helen is repelled by the decrepit Cush house, which is inseparable from her
reawakened fears, these negative associations ultimately trigger the retrieval of a positive place
memory of her childhood home. While lying awake in her grandmother’s house, the “the smell
of must and damp in the room” prompts her to recollect her return to her family’s house alone
before her father’s funeral. The house was pervaded by her father’s presence: “[Putting] her hand
on the kitchen door handle, she had realized that her father’s hand would have touched it too, his
fingerprints or the print of the palm of his hand had probably—no, definitely—been left there.
His hand was dead now, lying in his coffin. And this house, every inch of it, had his traces
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imprinted on it” (80). For the eleven-year-old Helen, touching the door handles and the
dishes was akin to putting her hand in her father’s, underscoring the inseparability of her love of
her father from the physical building. Helen’s construction of home place in childhood and its
reconstruction through memory echoes Bowlby and Tuan’s claim that the bodies of caregiving
family members are not affectively distinct from the physical surround for the infant, a fluid
affective relationship among persons and associated spaces that humans retain in adulthood. The
emotional affiliation of physical space and human others in establishing a “fixed reference point”
coheres with the logic of human evolution, which points to the functional efficacy of human
sociality in navigating geographically diverse areas, finding adequate habitats, and defending
against aggressors. The adult Helen’s memories establish the interlocked nature of these
homes—the childhood house her family no longer owns and her grandmother’s house--and the
necessity of their incorporation into her adult life.
In Godkin’s terminology, Helen has begun, through memory, to retrieve a place of value.
Nevertheless, Helen is unlikely to resolve the place relativity and alienation that go hand-inhand with her distrust of intimacy without changes to the sociocultural and behavioral setting
that she inhabits—changes that she cannot herself effect. Helen’s modern house and restrained
emotional and social life, like her mother’s, indicates that she has inverted the traditional patterns
of Irish culture, which identify women as the representatives of the church in the home,
responsible for safeguarding women’s sexuality and enforcing heterosexuality. As Edward A.
Hagan notes, many of Toíbín’s mothers reject the anonymity imposed by the Church and pursue
their own goals, with less than completely satisfactory results.51 But given the perpetuation of a
surveillance culture in traditional Irish towns, Helen, Lily and other women characters like them
in Toibin’s fiction (Nora Webster, Nancy in “The Name of the Game”) have no real choice but to
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relocate physically into urban areas or to remote locales and to sever ties with their
traditional communities, in effect choosing place relativity and exchanging anonymity for an
emotionally detached self as necessary components of relative independence.52
Not surprisingly, then, when these women are forced by circumstances to engage with
traditional small town community, they practice antisocial strategies of deception and avoidance.
After the women, Declan, and his gay friends convene at the Cush house to care for Declan, the
constraints of the behavioral setting emerge. Assisted by Lily and Helen, the elderly Dora
sidetracks her prying neighbors, Madge and Essie Kehoe, who are keen to identify Dora’s
visitors; later, Dora rushes the family out of church to avoid the questions of the larger
community about her guests and family. This collusion between the three women, which hides
the identities and sexualities of Dora’s guests, perpetuates the culture of shame and secrecy
surrounding homosexuality and the repressed identities of the women that govern the behavioral
setting. Moreover, that this cooperative act amongst the three women is one of deception
reinforces the ambivalence of their own emotional and social-familial bonds.
Considered in light of all the elements of place-in-process, weak social networks and
attendantly weak affective bonds amongst their members are apt to result in disproportionate
power for other factors, whether this is the nonhuman natural environment or governing
ideology, and the introduction of a new element into the dynamic may be a fundamental
condition of change.53 Declan and his friends Paul and Larry bring an alternative community to
the traditional family and, with it, a new willingness to communicate. Hagan claims that Toíbín
sometimes uses homosexuality “as curative of a misguided female liberation,”54 but in my view,
it is not so much that the concept of liberation is misguided but that environmental factors
constrain the success of self-initiated liberation for women.55 As Kaplan and Kaplan explain, the
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purpose of culture is to provide a map for healthy functioning, which entails both helping to
define a problem and to shape its solution.56 For Helen and Lily particularly, since their culture’s
ideology is conflicted, at the very least, about the contemporary role of women, they cannot
employ it fully as a guide or map for functioning, much less for large-scale change. In contrast,
Declan and his friends, by virtue of being men on one hand as well as true outsiders on the other
have, ironically, while nonetheless ostracized by virtue of their sexual orientation, enjoyed
freedom and greater geographic mobility that has fostered a new kind of social circle. In effect,
their true community is an alternative to the traditional Irish family, one in which Paul and Larry
have cared for Declan during the that time no one in his biological family has known that he has
contracted AIDS.57
With the arrival of Larry and Paul at Cush, Toíbín’s narrative undergoes a pronounced
shift toward social interaction, as autobiographical storytelling extends the bonds between the
gay men and the women in the family who have avoided communicating honestly (or at all) for
years. For many decades, cognitive psychology has recognized narrative as the backbone of
human thought and a central feature in rituals that provide social cohesion; in this novel,
storytelling creates new emotional bonds, a community of support, and a shift in beliefs that
begin to alter national ideology and the behavioral setting it enforces.58 Instructively, Helen’s
receptivity to change is signaled by her question to Larry—“Do your folks know you are gay?”
(142)—which begins a process of shared narratives. Åke Persson claims that The Blackwater
Lightship is a novel of education, whose central task is that of oral history, critiquing the
dominant historical account.59 Published in 1999, only six years after the decriminalization of
homosexuality in Ireland, The Blackwater Lightship is almost certainly intended to serve this
function. In this case, that means enlightening the public about gay experience, and in this
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respect the novel itself actively participates in re-envisioning place, especially in the
dimension of behavioral setting, on a national scale.
However, in welcoming stories about gay experience, the novel does more than enlighten
the readers about gay life: it models a new form of behavior premised on open communication
and selfless support among friends and family. In effect, the intensive storytelling in the second
half of the novel parallels the notion of coming out, in that characters honestly reveal their
accepted selves and experiences. Each tells her or his stories: Larry of revealing his sexuality to
his parents and of his multiple lovers from the same family; Dora of her subversion of the nun’s
plan to have Lily fulfill a religious vocation; Paul of his relationship with his husband Francois
and their secret marriage by a Belgian priest; Helen of her bitterness toward her mother and
grandmother; and finally, Lily of the traumatic experience of losing her young husband so many
years before.
In this series of shared and private conversations, Helen’s stories precipitate a social and
emotional shift for her that ultimately results in the reinvention of place as a shared activity.
Speaking privately to Paul, she explains that her mother has never met her husband or her sons
because of their attempts to arrange her life for her. Puzzled, he replies, “I don’t understand the
reason you didn’t want them at your wedding . . . . What you’ve told me isn’t reason enough’”
(184). Because Paul has honestly shared his experiences and troubles with her, a short time later,
she seeks him out and tells him of an experience several years before that made her realize that
she “had put away parts of herself that were damaged and rotting . . . ,” adding, “And these two
women are the parts of myself of myself that I have buried . . . and that is why I still want them
away from me” (188). In admitting that the “raw places in her which were unsettled an
untrusting” are part of a shared identity with her mother and grandmother, Helen acknowledges
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the linked nature of their selves. Perhaps more importantly, in sharing this with Paul, she
finally tells another of the grief and distrust she has not even revealed to her husband.
Pointedly, storytelling is attended by reconceptualization of place in the specific home
that is the emotional source of past grievances and wounds. Alongside the modifications to self
for the women in the family through a shift toward honest self-revelation, Dora consults with
Larry, an architect, about renovations to the Cush house. The plans involve knocking down walls
to eliminate the dining room and to provide for a downstairs bathroom and bedroom. Thus, this
renovation would bring an open floor plan, similar to Helen and Hugh’s great room, into an older
Irish house. Larry’s words, “It would be like a new house. You wouldn’t know yourself” (157),
mark the transformation of space into a reconceptualized place, one associated with sociality and
emotional openness, and thus with altered identity. Whether the space, the physical house, will
actually be remodeled is beside the point. As Altman and Low emphasize, “[P]laces may vary in
several ways—scale or size and scope, tangible versus symbolic, known and experience versus
not known or not experienced.”60 Following this logic, just as place may be either associated
with an actual physical space or a wholly imagined one, the imaginative reconceptualization of
an unaltered physical space can result in a changed notion of place, which is attended by a shift
along the attachment spectrum (perhaps from alienation to place relativity for Helen), matched
by adjustment in the self.
Locating these developments in Toíbín’s narrative within the cognitive-evolutionary
critique of affect theory indicates a far different relationship among affect, interpersonal social
relations, place perception, and exploration of physical space than that late poststructuralist
model claims. Whereas Massumi asserts that “situated perceptions and cognitions fulfilling
functions of actual connection or blockage are the capture and closure of affect,” the trajectory
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of the novel shows that the broader social engagement of characters in the Cush house
emerges alongside an expanded sense of place concomitant with more open and extensive
emotional expression, as the strand itself increasingly becomes the site of stories and personal
epiphanies. Thus, the characters’ perceptions and cognitions in their moments of connection
facilitate healthy interaction rather than causing blockage; more than this, they provide the basis
of social support and self-coherence that goes hand-in-hand with an exploratory approach to
physical space and a fluid, expansive conception of place. In short, the pattern of the novel
strongly suggests that genuine emotional interactions with places and persons encourage more
broad-ranging affectivity, rather than the reverse.
In keeping with this, Helen’s existential epiphany on the beach depersonalizes the “raw
parts” of herself associated with the Cush house, including them in an encompassing, universal
perspective. As Liam Harte observes, in this novel “the same closely observed marine landscape
provides the spatial frame within which familial relations are again healed and restored, and
tentative new configurations of family forged.”61 Beginning with several places curated, as it
were, to control emotions and relationships and to prohibit memory, the novel gradually
envisions the dynamic interrelation of these locations as an integral feature of shared identity and
suffering. Helen thinks back with renewed understanding to her own withdrawal from the family
after her father’s death and of her mother’s imminent repetition of loss as she explores a
neighbor’s home destroyed by cliff erosion, “[stopping to look once more] at the shreds of
wallpaper and the floorboards and the half-rooms open to the wind and the sea” (217). Mirroring
her first reaction to the decaying interior of her grandmother’s house, these impressions of the
Keating’s exposed and ruined house drive home the inextricability of natural and cultural
phenomena, pointing especially toward a necessary integration of death and loss and the long
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grieving process into the “fixed point of reference,” the home. Just before this, Helen
remembers a similar moment after her father’s death, when she “imagined the sea, angry and
inexorable . . . [and] the dead being washed out of their graves, houses crumbling and falling,
cars being dragged out into the unruly ocean until there was nothing anymore but this vast
chaos” (216). In the present, she still feels its unstoppable existential force but no longer
reconstitutes it in the shape of her childhood anger.
The counterpoint movement of stories, persons, and physical location (between the Cush
and the strand) in this last part of the novel emphasizes the dynamism of place-in-process,
epitomized in the renewal of communication between Lily and Helen that will, in turn,
incorporate the past into Helen’s home. Just before Helen’s moment of existential revelation,
Lily shares with her daughter her romantic childhood fantasy of the two lighthouses, Tuskar and
Blackwater, the latter of which had been taken down many years before. Explaining that, as an
adult, she associated these lighthouses with her husband and herself, Lily says, “You know, I
thought your father would live forever. So I learned things very bitterly’” (192). As Lily exposes
her neediness in the face of her son’s imminent death, Helen finally realizes and tells her mother,
that, as a child, she thought Lily had taken their father away from them. This mutual admission
of feeling opens up the opportunity for renewed relations between mother and daughter, a change
whose broader affective, social, and place dimensions Toíbín signals, albeit tentatively, as
mother and daughter sing together on the drive north to Dublin. Tellingly, the last pages of the
novel take place in Helen’s Dublin house, where Lily and Helen drink tea and wait the return of
Hugh and the boys after taking Declan to the hospital. Implicitly, this is the first in a pattern of
non-intrusive visits Lily hopes to make to visit her daughter, son-in-law, and grandsons, thus
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pointing toward a transformation of Helen’s attraction to “the idea that no one had ever lived
[in the house] before” (15).
Perhaps Helen and Lily, through the beginnings of a reconciliation effected by a return to
the Cush house in the company of a new and supportive mediating family of gay men, can
rehabilitate the selves, feelings, relationship, and environments that they have consciously sought
to control. Perhaps, for Helen, this will lead to feelings of insideness and aspects of traditional
attachment in her home, with which her mother and the past are now associated. People with
strong attachments experience overall higher life satisfaction, social capital, and better general
adjustment, and interest in family history and self-coherence are positively correlated with strong
place attachment.62 Novels like The Blackwater Lightship illuminate the dynamics of place-inprocess, showing how feelings for persons and locations are interrelated and in many respects
constitutive of human behavior. This essay has sought to demonstrate that “situated perceptions
and cognitions fulfilling functions of actual connection” are not, as Massumi claims, the “capture
and closure of affect” but, much to the contrary, integral parts of the purpose and perpetuation of
feeling. Guiding understanding of the complexity of emotional intensities, place studies, as a tool
for literary analysis, enables articulation of the sources, purposes, and changes in those feelings
in relation to the environment. As such, like the rich array of cognitive literary approaches
available now, it points toward the enduring ethical relevance of literature and criticism.
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